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Introduction
Families in Poland have been changing in many ways over the last quarter of 
a century. Since 1989 when the transformation process began we’ve been observ‑
ing stable fertility decline and postponement of nuptiality (Mynarska 2009: 19; 
Kotowska et al. 2008: 796). Thus it can be said that nowadays family formation 
patterns are different than a few decades ago. According to the authors of OECD 
report, such changes are caused by changed meaning of the concept of a success‑
ful life preferred by women and men: 
Increasingly, both men and women want to first establish themselves in the labour 
market before founding a  family. Hence, the age of mothers at first childbirth 
has risen and with it the probability of having fewer children than the previous 
generations. Many women remain childless. Birth rates have fallen and life ex‑
pectancy has increased, so there are fewer children and more grandparents than 
before. (OECD 2011: 18)
Accordingly, the declining propensity to marriage and childbearing post‑
ponement, limiting the number of children, and the rise in childlessness are 
the most significant factors influencing the shape of contemporary families in 
Poland. It should also be stressed that fertility is still strongly connected to nup‑
tiality in Poland, which means that marriage and parenthood are closely related 
(Mynarska 2009: 24).
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During the last three decades we have observed a  growing frequency of 
divorce and separation as well growing popularity of cohabitations and LAT 
relationships (living ‑apart ‑together) which indicate that marriage has lost its in‑
strumental significance in forming a family (Kotowska et al. 2008: 798). For that 
reason there is no single correct definition of what a family is as we can observe 
the openness to family diversity in Poland nowadays. “Traditional families” 
based on marriage coexist with many other family types, such as cohabitation, 
single ‑parent families, gay and lesbian parents. There are also some other alter‑
native family forms like singlehood, DINKs (Dual Income, No Kids), same sex 
couples with no kids etc.
The aim of the text is to describe the main changes in family formation proc‑
esses in Poland and to show their major determinants. The theoretical frame‑
work for this article is built around the concept of the Second Demographic 
Transition (SDT) which is one of the most popular theoretical models explaining 
family ‑related behaviors that have been occurring in most European countries 
in the second half of 20th century and presently.
The concept of the Second Demographic Transition
There are many theories which can be used to explain family ‑related behav‑
iors in the modern world1. The model of the Second Demographic Transition is 
only one of them. It was coined in 1986 by Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa 
(Van de Kaa 1987). Their concept refers to the First (or “classic”) Demographic 
Transition (FDT) that occurred in the Western countries from the 18th and 19th 
centuries onward and during the second half of the 20th century in most of 
the rest of the world2 (Lesthaeghe 2010: 211). The end point of FDT “(…) was 
supposed to be an old stationary population corresponding with replacement 
fertility (i.e. just over two children on average), zero population growth, and life 
expectancies over 70. y.” (Lesthaeghe 2014: 18112). The FDT theory’s authors 
presumed that the balance between the low number of deaths and births would 
be maintained, so there wouldn’t be need for sustained immigration. They were 
also persuaded that households in all parts of the world would be created by 
nuclear families, based on married couples and their children. However their 
1 The most often used concepts and theories explaining low fertility are: demographic transi‑
tions and post ‑materialistic values, gender equity theory, globalization and uncertainty theory, 
microeconomic theories, individual behaviors’ theories (see: Mynarska 2009, Janiszewska 2013, 
Slany 2006).
2 As Lesthaeghe (2010: 211) claims: “At present, there are barely a dozen countries that have 
not begun a fertility decline.”
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expectations were erroneous. In the middle of the 1960s, the industrialized 
countries reached a new stage in their demographic development – a stage char‑
acterized by full control over fertility. In such circumstances “as couples appear 
to lack the motivation to have more than one or two children, fertility declined 
below replacement level” (Van de Kaa 2003: 2). The demographers highlighted 
that it was rather a permanent change than a  temporary anomaly and defined 
it as a  new demographic imbalance. New demographic phenomena demanded 
a new theoretical framework to explain features such as “[…] the baby bust, the 
systematic postponement of marriage and parenthood, subreplacement fertility, 
the rise of alternative forms of partnership, and parenthood outside marriage” 
(Lesthaeghe 2014: 18112). Thus the SDT concept emerged to describe various 
determinants of this change3.
According to Dirk van de Kaa (1987: 5) the beginning of the Second Demo‑
graphic Transition can arbitrarily be marked at 1965, although the first signs of 
the transition showed already back in the 1950s. It appeared that in the US and 
Scandinavia the divorce rates were growing and people started to withdraw from 
long ‑life commitments, which was justified by the logic that “a good divorce is 
better than a bad marriage” (Lesthaeghe 2010: 212). Nevertheless, in the second 
half of the 1960s onward some other family ‑related behaviors changed visibly. 
These trends included fertility postponement, decline in birth rates, growing 
number of extramarital births, and the increasing popularity of living arrange‑
ments other than marriage (lone parenthood, cohabitation, singlehood etc.) 
(Mynarska 2009: 41). Thus, according to the SDT authors, the weakening of the 
institution of family is considered to be characteristic for the second tradition. 
This is what van de Kaa says:
We identified the increase in divorce as the first manifestation of that weakening. 
The changed attitudes towards abortion, the increase in cohabitation in countries 
outside the Nordic region, the easy acceptance of modern contraceptives amongst 
the more orthodox section of the population, and the decline in – higher order – 
births were, however, also interpreted in this context. (Van de Kaa 2003: 6) 
Demographic phenomena distinctive for the SDT are situated in two spheres: 
nuptiality and fertility. Nuptiality trends indicated by Lesthaeghe and van de 
Kaa (Lesthaeghe 2014: 18113–18114; Okólski 2005: 146) are presented below:
•	 More frequent premarital sexual relations.
•	 Lowering percentage of the married population.
3 Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa declare that their concept stems from at least four 
sources. The first of them is Philippe Ariès’ analysis of the history of childhood. The second is the 
cyclical fertility theory by Richard Easterlin. The third source is thee neoclassical economy. The 
fourth element conditioning the SDT theory is Abraham Maslow’s theory of changing needs and 
Ronald Inglehart’s post ‑materialistic theory of values (see: Van de Kaa 2003, Lesthaeghe 2014, 
Lesthaeghe 2010). 
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•	 Rising age average upon first marriage.
•	 Increasing long ‑term cohabitation, both pre ‑ and postmarital.
•	 Increase in singlehood.
•	 Rise in divorce rates, earlier divorces.
•	 Decline in remarriage rates, LAT relationships instead.
New behaviors connected with fertility are:
•	 Fertility postponement, increasing age average for parenthood, structural 
subreplacement fertility.
•	 Decreasing average number of children in a family.
•	 Efficient contraception.
•	 Rising nonmarital childbearing rate, parenthood outside marriage (among 
cohabiting couples, single mothers).
•	 Rising definitive childlessness among women, even in a union.
It should be also stressed that these demographic changes have societal back‑
ground – there are certain social phenomena related to the SDT and Lesthaeghe 
(2014: 18113) list includes:
•	 Rise of the importance of “higher order” needs: individual autonomy, expres‑
sive work and socialization values, self ‑actualization, grass ‑roots democracy, 
recognition, tolerance as prime value.
•	 Disengagement from civic activity and community ‑oriented networks.
•	 Retreat of the state, second secularization wave, sexual revolution, rejection of 
authority, political “depillarization.”
•	 Growing symmetry in sex roles, rising female education levels, greater female 
economic autonomy.
•	 Flexible life ‑course organization, multiple lifestyles, open future.
Thus the SDT contains several shifts concerning family models as well as 
emerging and dissolving marriage standards (Van de Kaa 1987: 11):
1. Shift from the “golden age of marriage” to the “dawn of cohabitation.”
2. Shift from the era of the “king ‑child with parents” to that of the king pair 
with a child.”
3. Shift from “preventive contraception” to “self ‑fulfilling conception.”
4. Shift from “uniform” to “pluralistic families and households.”
Taking into consideration all features of the SDT that were described above, it 
must be said that modernization processes which have been shaping the Western 
countries since the beginning of 1960s should be considered the main determi‑
nants of the family model shifts and the change of attitudes towards fertility 
(Szlendak 2010: 392; Kurek, Lange 2013: 8–9). Demographic transition spread 
from the Western and Northern European countries to the Southern and Cen‑
tral Europe. According to van de Kaa (2003: 23–25) there are three components 
of the modernization process that influence family ‑related behaviors, that is, 
structural, cultural, and technological. Structural changes concern industrializa‑
tion and development of services, urbanization and other processes leading to the 
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development of post ‑industrial society and the welfare (Kotowska et al. 2008: 
796). Cultural transition is connected with political and global changes, leading 
to the development of democracy and – last but not least – changes in values 
systems. In this context, authors of the SDT model refer to Inglehart’s post 
materialistic values theory (Inglehart 2007; Surkyn, Lesthaeghe 2004) and the 
concept of the “silent revolution,” according to which in the mid ‑1960s value 
orientations transformed from modern to post ‑modern ones. As they claim:
For the shift to post ‑materialism accentuated the growing importance of antiestab‑
lishment orientations and of individual and societal emancipation. The second 
transition, so it appeared to us, was grounded in an ideology of self ‑development 
or self ‑fulfillment. (van de Kaa 2003: 25)
The third component is a technological change associated with the develop‑
ment of contraception (the so called “second contraceptive revolution”) (see, for 
example, Janiszewska 2013: 60), medicine, telecommunication, along with the 
spread of information via television.
It is said that two of the mentioned components – technology and culture 
– are of great importance in explaining marital and procreative behaviors (Ko‑
towska et al. 2008: 796): 
Economic developments, the rising standards of living, the growing employment 
of women, and the development of the welfare state are associated with higher 
educational attainment and an increasing social and spatial mobility of the 
population. Taking together, these factors influence people’s capability to benefit 
increasingly from technological process and to support ideational change.
In 1986 when the concept of the SDT was first formulated its authors were 
convinced that the phenomenon they described could “(…) be compared to 
a  cyclone irresistibly sweeping south from Scandinavia and gradually engulf‑
ing the South of Europe before turning East and, most probably, to other parts 
of the developed world” (Van de Kaa 2003: 30). However after less than two 
decades they had to admit that such a metaphor is not completely appropriate. 
Van de Kaa remarked that the specificity of SDT processes depends on various 
factors distinctive for each society and each country. Mainly, he indicates such 
determinants as demographic heritage and cultural endowment. The transition 
is influenced by the diffusion of culture (also innovative forms of behavior), 
but the reaction to it depends on how well new ideas can be incorporated into 
existing patterns and traditions of a given society (Van de Kaa 2003: 30). Many 
new family ‑related behaviors like cohabiting, having a  child outside marriage, 
ending marriage through divorce etc. can spread more slowly in some countries. 
Additionally, the economic, social, and cultural situation influences attitudes 
towards new lifestyle trends. 
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The main changes in family formation processes 
in Poland after 1989
Poland is one of the countries where SDT was initiated after the fall of the 
communist regime in 1989 when the transformation period began. After the Sec‑
ond World War fertility and nuptiality trends fluctuated and the changes were 
explained as resulting from “subsequent compensatory behaviors” (Mynarska 
2009: 19). The postwar baby boom of the 1950s “echoed” in the late 1970s and 
the early 1980s. The numbers of births rose sharply from an annual average of 
600 000 in 1971–1975 to 676 000 in 1976–1980 and almost 701 000 in 1981–1983. 
In 1983 the number of birth was the highest in 22 years – it reached 720  000 
(total fertility rate was 2,40) (Van de Kaa 1987: 53). Demographers related this 
tendency to the parallel socio ‑political process, as the fertility rise in Poland 
took place in a  time of social, political and economic crisis. They specify some 
explanations of this phenomenon in the following terms:
•	 In times of social disintegration, people fall back on the family.
•	 There was a lack of confidence in the stability of government policy on matters 
such as maternity leave and child support.
•	 Official Roman Catholic Church views on the sanctity of the family and pro‑
hibition of artificial contraception and abortion gained influence, due to the 
important role the church has played in Polish society during and since the 
crisis.
•	 Due to acute shortages of consumer goods, any spare income could be devoted 
to new babies.
•	 The crisis fostered a renewed pride of the nation (Jóźwiak, Słaby cited in Van 
de Kaa 1987: 53). 
The transformation of the economic and political system in Poland thus initi‑
ated the changes distinctive for the SDT. The transformation included the shift 
from a centrally planned economy to market economy, which means that the social 
welfare function was remarkably reduced. Consequently, households were now 
more in direct responsibility for their financial situation. Radical changes in the 
conditions of the labor market participation and the loss of individual economic 
stability, as well as institutional adjustments to the political system led to significant 
rearrangements in terms of family ‑related behaviors (Kurek, Lange 2013: 11). In 
other words, these fundamental economic and social changes have influenced the 
perception of the preferences and constraints of individuals and groups (Kotowska 
et al. 2008: 796–797). According to van de Kaa, who described the situation in Po‑
land, (2003: 31): “[a]fter 1989 many new problems arose, they affected demographic 
behavior and, in turn, made new behavioral choices possible.” 
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One of the most visible changes concerns nuptiality. It can be said that mar‑
riage as an institution is not as important as it was over the ages. Young people 
postpone marriage and childbearing as obtaining a  diploma or professional 
qualification as well as finding a  job are of primary importance and precede 
family formation (Mynarska 2009: 40). The decrease in the number of marital 
unions results from marriage not being a sole and unique way of forming family 
anymore. The number of cohabitations, LAT relationships and single parents 
increases which means that some alternatives for marriage become more and 
more acceptable in the Polish society. Simultaneously, a  higher frequency of 
divorces and separations is observed. These changes can be connected with the 
shift of the values system, which is typical for societies where modernization 
processes are in progress4. Another change is related to fertility patterns. As 
it was mentioned above, young people tend to postpone the decision to have 
their first child, which leads to the decline in birth rates. At the same time, the 
number of extra ‑marital births has been growing. Consequently, since 1989 the 
fertility rate in Poland has been below the replacement level.
The above ‑mentioned changes can be described by recourse to demographic 
indicators. Table 1 presents data concerning marriages and divorces in Poland 
in 1989–2014. At the beginning of this period the number of marriages was 
255,7 thousand and it has been decreasing to 203,6 thousand in 1996. During 
the next four years it rose to 211,2 thousand and then dropped to 191,8 thousand 
in 2004. From 2005 to 2012 the number of marriages exceeded 200,0 thousand. 
The highest annual total of marriages was recorded in 2008 – it was more than 
257,0 thousand which was the consequence of baby boomers born in the late 
1970s and the beginning of 1980s getting married. From 2009 onward there have 
been less and less new marriages in Poland – in 2013 and 2014 less than 190,0 
thousand couples decided to get married. 
Also the analysis of the nuptiality rate (the number of marriages per 1000 
population) in 1989–2014 leads to the conclusion that the proportion of mar‑
riages to the number of the general population is less favorable now than it was 
at the beginning of this period. The highest nuptiality rate was reached in 1989, 
1990 (6,7) and 2008 (6,8). In 2013 and 2014 it didn’t exceed 5,0.
The official statistics show that marriages in Poland become less and less 
stable. There were 47,2 thousands of divorces in 1989, then – after a short ‑term 
(1991–1993) the decrease in the number of dissolved marriages started to in‑
tensify again up to 71,9 thousand in 2006. From 2007 the number of divorces 
stabilized at around 65,0 thousand (the exception is 2010, when 61,0 thousand 
of marriages were dissolved). Also the dynamics of the divorce rate is evidence 
of an increasing inconstancy of marriages in Poland. Apart from 2005 onward 
the number of divorces per 1000 population is about 1,7, whilst in 1989 it 
4 See the previous part of the article, where Inglehart’s concept is mentioned.
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reached the level of 1,2. The lowest rate values were noted in 1993 (0,7), 1992 and 
1994 (0,8).
Table 1. Marriage and divorce statistics in Poland 1989–2014
Year
Marriages Divorces
in thousands per 1000 population in thousands per 1000 population
1989 255,7 6,7 47,2 1,2
1990 255,4 6,7 42,4 1,1
1991 233,2 6,1 33,8 0,9
1992 217,3 5,7 32,0 0,8
1993 207,7 5,4 27,9 0,7
1994 207,7 5,4 31,6 0,8
1995 207,1 5,4 38,1 1,0
1996 203,6 5,3 39,4 1,0
1997 204,9 5,3 42,6 1,1
1998 209,4 5,4 45,2 1,2
1999 219,4 5,7 42,0 1,1
2000 211,2 5,5 42,8 1,1
2001 195,1 5,1 45,3 1,2
2002 191,9 5,0 45,4 1,2
2003 195,4 5,1 48,6 1,3
2004 191,8 5,0 56,3 1,5
2005 206,9 5,4 67,6 1,8
2006 226,2 5,9 71,9 1,9
2007 248,7 6,5 66,6 1,7
2008 257,7 6,8 65,5 1,7
2009 250,8 6,6 65,3 1,7
2010 228,3 5,9 61,3 1,6
2011 206,5 5,4 64,6 1,7
2012 203,9 5,3 64,4 1,7
2013 180,4 4,7 66,1 1,7
2014 188,5 4,9 65,8 1,7
S ource: Central Statistical Office (CSO) data. All data in tables 1 and 2 come from the Statistical Yearbooks of 
Poland.
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Since 1989 a  rapid decline in births has also been observed in Poland. The 
overall number of live births has dropped by 33.5% from 564,4 thousand in 1989 
to 375,2 thousand in 2014. The lowest number of new born babies was recorded 
in 2003 (351,1 thousands), then it grew to 417,6 thousands in 2009, which can 
be explained by the fact that baby boomers born at the beginning of the 1980s 
reached the age of marital and procreative activity.
The tendencies described above can be also confirmed by changes in birth 
rate values. In 1989 there was 14,9 live births per 1000 population, in 2003 it 
reached a  level of 9,2 which was the lowest rate throughout the study period. 
Then the birth rate rose to 10,9 in 2008 and started to decrease to 9,7 in 
2014.
Changes in fertility can be also described using Total fertility rate (TFR) 
indicator5. In 1989 the Total fertility rate was 2,078 – slightly below the replace‑
ment level and it continued dropping until 2003 (1,222). An increase was sub‑
sequently observed in 2009, when the TFR was 1,398. The recent years brought 
stabilization in the fertility rate around 1,290.
The trend to give birth later in life is one of the explanations of decreasing 
fertility in Poland. From 1989 to 2013 the mean age of women at first childbirth 
systematically increased from 23,6 years to 26,7 years. The postponement of 
parenthood entails the reduction in number of offspring so the average family 
size has been shrinking. 
Moreover, the rapidly growing percentage of out ‑of ‑wedlock births breaks 
the monopoly of family with both parents in marriage as the only institution 
and educational environment where children are born and brought up. In 1989 
the proportion of live births outside marriage was less than 6.0%, whilst in 1996 
it exceeded 10.0%. The latest statistics (2013) prove that almost every fourth child 
is born outside marriage. Thus “the trend in out ‑of ‑wedlock births provides 
evidence that the shifts in behavior resulted from gradually changing attitudes 
towards births delivered out ‑of ‑wedlock by never ‑married women or women in 
cohabitation, especially among young persons living in urban areas” (Kotowska 
et all 2008: 815).
5 The Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if 
she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current 
age ‑specific fertility rates. A  rate of 2,1 children per woman is considered the replacement rate 
for a population, resulting in relative stability in terms of total numbers. Rates above 2,1 children 
indicate populations growing in size and whose median age is lowering. Rates below 2,1 children 
indicate populations decreasing in size and growing older (see: http://www.indexmundi.com/po‑
land/total_fertility_rate.html).
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Table 2. Fertility indicators in Poland 1989–2014
Year
Live births
Total fertility rate
Proportion of live 
births outside 
marriage
Mean age of 
mother at first 
birth
(in years)
in thousands per 1000 population
1989 564,4 14,9 2,078 5,8 23,6
1990 547,7 14,3 2,039 6,2 23,5
1991 547,7 14,3 2,049 6,6 23,4
1992 515,2 13,5 1,992 7,2 23,4
1993 494,3 12,8 1,847 8,2 23,4
1994 481,3 12,2 1,798 9,0 23,4
1995 433,1 11,2 1,611 9,5 23,5
1996 428,2 11,1 1,580 10,2 23,6
1997 412,7 10,7 1,513 11,0 23,7
1998 395,6 10,2 1,431 11,6 23,8
1999 382,0 9,9 1,366 11,7 24,0
2000 378,3 9,8 1,337 12,1 24,2
2001 368,2 9,5 1,315 13,2 24,4
2002 353,8 9,3 1,249 14,4 24,6
2003 351,1 9,2 1,222 15,8 24,9
2004 356,1 9,3 1,227 17,1 25,2
2005 364,4 9,5 1,243 18,5 25,5
2006 374,2 9,8 1,267 18,9 25,9
2007 387,9 10,2 1,306 19,5 26,0
2008 414,5 10,9 1,390 19,9 26,0
2009 417,6 10,6 1,398 20,2 26,2
2010 413,3 10,7 1,376 20,7 26,5
2011 388,4 10,1 1,297 21,3 26,6
2012 386,3 10,0 1,299 22,3 26,6
2013 369,6 9,6 1,256 23,4 26,7
2014 375,2 9,7 1,290 – –
S ource: Central Statistical Office (CSO) data.
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Conclusions
The decreasing propensity to marry and to have children as well as the 
postponement of both decisions seem to mark the main directions of change in 
family formation patterns in Poland after 1989. These phenomena are distinctive 
for the SDT, thus it can be said that family development in Poland is similar to 
the processes observed in other European countries (Kotowska et al. 2008: 845). 
The reasons of this transformation are in line with the structural aspects of the 
process of modernization, such as economic development, labor ‑market partici‑
pation, household policies and globalization, which all foster family ‑unfriendly 
conditions (Kotowska et al: 846). The high unemployment rate, unstable and 
discontinuous employment, as well as the growing importance of education and 
permanently upgrading one’s professional skills make young people postpone 
marriage and childbearing. Additionally, the increasing costs of raising children 
discourage them from having big families, as material considerations are highly 
important for their fertility plans (Mynarska 2009: 39–40).
Despite all these, the researchers who analyze the demographic change in 
Poland indicate some differences between family ‑related developments in Poland 
and in other countries, which result from the cultural component of the moderni‑
zation processes. They claim that the “ideational change has not advanced until 
recently compared with its progress in other European countries” (Kotowska et 
al. 2008: 845). This means that the Polish society is still fairly traditional. Both 
family and children are of importance – they have a prime value and marriage 
seems to be the inherent base for family. This is why gender roles are still defined 
in a traditional way by a great part of the Polish society, which makes reconcil‑
ing work with family duties difficult or even impossible. There is still a scarcity 
of flexible work arrangements available, as well as of institutional childcare etc. 
Nevertheless some changes in the Poles’ attitudes towards family are noticeable – 
“[t]he processes of secularization, individualization, and wide acceptance of 
Western family life models, which are promoted by the mass media, are influ‑
encing family choices” (Mynarska 2009: 40). It is not easy to predict when (if 
ever) the ideational shift in Poland becomes a fact – it is still uncertain whether 
the pace of the ideational change will increase or whether the traditional Polish 
culture will counterbalance this shift.
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